{"id":116325,"date":"2026-03-09T04:50:48","date_gmt":"2026-03-09T07:50:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/shipping.einnews.com\/article\/898239245"},"modified":"2026-03-09T04:50:48","modified_gmt":"2026-03-09T07:50:48","slug":"two-iranian-boxships-under-way-with-suspected-rocket-fuel-cargoes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new7.shop\/zerocostfreehost\/index.php\/2026\/03\/09\/two-iranian-boxships-under-way-with-suspected-rocket-fuel-cargoes\/","title":{"rendered":"Two Iranian Boxships Under Way With Suspected Rocket Fuel Cargoes"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Washington Post has suggested that two vessels owned by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) have left the port of Gaolan in Zhuhai, China, destined for Bandar Abbas and potentially laden with sodium perchlorate – a chemical used for manufacturing solid fuel for ballistic missiles.<\/p>\n

Sodium perchlorate is the primary material used to manufacture ammonium perchlorate, which in turn makes up 70% of the standard fuel load of most of Iran\u2019s solid-fueled ballistic missiles. Iran used to have some ability to manufacture sodium perchlorate on its own, and could also obtain supply from Russia. But a substantial proportion of Iran\u2019s requirement from sodium perchlorate has for some time been met by importing the material from China on board a shuttle of IRISL ships.<\/p>\n

The Washington Post provided no evidence that these particular ships had been loaded with sodium perchlorate, basing its report on an analysis of previous movements and the sanctioned status of the two named ships. Large numbers of IRISL ships ply the China to Bandar Abbas route, carrying a variety of cargos. Both the container ships, the Iranian-flagged Shabdis <\/em>(IMO 9349588) and the Hong Kong-flagged Barzin <\/em>(sometimes traveling as the Fanreach<\/em>, IMO 9820269), are subject to secondary sanctions by the US Treasury\u2019s OFAC on account of their control by IRISL. But Barzin <\/em>has also been linked to a previous suspected shipment of sodium perchlorate, which left Gaolan on October 2 and arrived in Bandar Abbas on October 16 last year.<\/p>\n

The IRISL ships plying this particular route can normally carry more than 5,000 20-foot containers apiece. The Maritime Executive has tracked numerous mixed cargos on their passage from China to Iran, and specifically the deliveries from Shanghai to Bandar Abbas made by IRISL cargo ships MVs Golbon <\/em>and Jairan<\/em>. These two vessels brought in a total of 58 containers of sodium perchlorate used for manufacturing solid fuel for ballistic missiles, a consignment widely believed to have precipitated the explosion in Bandar Abbas which devastated the commercial port area on April 26 last year. Hence containers loaded with sodium perchlorate typically would form only a small part of an overall cargo. <\/p>\n

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The explosion at the Rajaei Port container park in Bandar Abbas on April 26<\/em><\/p>\n

Dual-use products, and specifically if they were being conveyed on a ship belonging to IRISL, should fall under the provisions of UN Security Resolution 1929, which cautions states to be aware of IRISL\u2019s sanctions-breaking activities and its role in supporting Iran\u2019s missile development, manufacture and maintenance activities. UNSCR 1929 specifically covers weapons systems related (or dual-use) materials.  It calls on “States to inspect any vessel on their territory suspected of carrying prohibited cargo, including banned conventional arms or sensitive nuclear or missile items. States are also expected to cooperate in such inspections on the high seas and are obligated to seize and dispose of the prohibited items when they are found.” These sanctions have been strengthened since snap-back sanctions were re-imposed by the UN Security Council on September 28 last year.<\/p>\n

Chinese unwillingness to observe UNSCR 1929 was evident last year when a US special operations team intercepted a ship off Sri Lanka and confiscated part of its cargo. The material seized consisted of dual-use components manufactured in China, such as spectrometers and gyroscopes, which can be used to improve the precision of guided missiles. The components were en route to Iran.<\/p>\n

On November 12 last year, coincident with the interception at sea, the US Treasury sanctioned a widespread network of companies based in China, Iran, Turkey and the UAE involved in the supply and delivery of dual-use components used for Iranian ballistic missile and drone production. The sanctions notice detailed supply, shipping routes, and one specific ship, the Panama-flagged bulk carrier Shun Kai Xing<\/em>, sometimes known as the Honestar <\/em>(IMO 9187368). The Honestar <\/em>was cited in the US Treasury notice for shipping “a computer numerical control machine used to produce fiber optic gyroscopes, guidance and control systems for weapons systems including ballistic missiles and UAVs.”<\/p>\n

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