{"id":112314,"date":"2026-03-05T19:05:53","date_gmt":"2026-03-05T22:05:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/shipping.einnews.com\/article\/897506002"},"modified":"2026-03-05T19:05:53","modified_gmt":"2026-03-05T22:05:53","slug":"court-grapples-with-whether-federal-law-supersedes-negligent-hiring-claims-against-freight-brokers","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new7.shop\/zerocostfreehost\/index.php\/2026\/03\/05\/court-grapples-with-whether-federal-law-supersedes-negligent-hiring-claims-against-freight-brokers\/","title":{"rendered":"Court grapples with whether federal law supersedes negligent hiring claims against freight brokers"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/div>\n

The Supreme Court on Wednesday heard argument<\/a> in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC<\/em><\/a>, a case on whether federal law prevents state law claims allowing brokers to be held liable for negligently selecting motor carriers or drivers.<\/p>\n

<\/span> <\/p>\n

\u201cA quick way to estimate any case\u2019s importance is to look at which groups are interested enough to submit amicus<\/em> curiae<\/em> (\u2018friend of the court\u2019) briefs,\u201d one journal article suggested<\/a> the day before the oral argument. \u201cBased on this metric, Caribe Transport<\/em> [was] a blockbuster, featuring amicus participation from the biggest companies (Amazon<\/a>), trade associations (U.S. Chamber [of] Commerce<\/a>), and even the federal government (acting through the Solicitor General<\/a>).\u201d<\/p>\n

The case stems from an accident on an Illinois highway in which Shawn Montgomery suffered severe injuries. The driver of the vehicle that hit Montgomery was employed by Caribe Transport II, an Indiana-based interstate motor carrier. The shipment, a load of plastic pots, was arranged by freight broker C.H. Robinson Worldwide and its affiliates under a carrier agreement with Caribe II.<\/p>\n

Montgomery filed suit in 2019 against, among others, Caribe Transport II and Robinson, contending that the broker negligently hired a motor carrier. Robinson moved to dismiss the negligent-hiring counts against it, arguing<\/a> that Montgomery\u2019s state claims were superseded by Section 14501(c)(1) of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994<\/a>, which bars state suits \u201crelated to a price, route, or service\u201d of brokers \u201cwith respect to the transportation of property.\u201d<\/p>\n

The district court held that while the negligent-hiring claims related to broker services, they fell within the safety exception of Section 14501(c)(2)(A), which preserves \u201csafety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.\u201d<\/p>\n

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed<\/a>, holding that \u201cthe FAAAA preempts state law claims that a freight broker negligently hired a motor carrier.\u201d<\/p>\n

Montgomery then came to the Supreme Court, which granted review in early October<\/a> to resolve a conflict between the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit (which held such a claim is not preempted) and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 7th and 11th Circuits (which held<\/a> that \u201c[a]ny claim that a broker negligently selected a driver to haul a load of property\u201d is preempted).<\/p>\n

Representing Montgomery, Paul Clement told the justices on Wednesday that Congress intended to deregulate the economics of the trucking industry, but intentionally preserved state safety regulations for motor vehicles, and that state negligent hiring torts had traditionally been used against carriers and brokers alike.<\/p>\n

Justice Brett Kavanaugh raised what he characterized as an \u201coddity\u201d in Clement\u2019s theory: that it would (counterintuitively) mean state claims against brokers are preempted for intrastate but not interstate transportation. Clement responded by arguing Congress had a separate clause for interstate transportation. Justice Elena Kagan similarly pressed Clement on why Congress would have created the intrastate versus interstate issue, to which Clement responded that it might have been due to different interest groups \u2013 but that ultimately, this case focuses on Section 14501(c) and not other provisions.<\/p>\n

Kagan also pressed Clement on whether his theory would allow suits against shippers. Clement replied yes. When Kagan later raised the companies\u2019 argument that reading the safety exception broadly would make the phrase \u201cwith respect to motor vehicles\u201d swallow the entire preemption clause, Clement countered that the statutory definition of \u201ctransportation\u201d is massive \u2014 it includes vessels, warehouses, and docks \u2014 so the motor-vehicle carve-out is not nearly as broad as might be surmised.<\/p>\n

There were also lots of questions on what exactly constitutes a \u201cdirect connection\u201d to motor vehicles. Justice Samuel Alito asked how far this reached \u2013 and if the limit is proximate cause (the motor vehicle being sufficiently as opposed to distantly related to the accident). Clement agreed that the limit is proximate cause and that nothing \u201cwildly indirect\u201d or \u201cbutterfly effect<\/a>\u201d would qualify, based on the court\u2019s own language in prior cases excluding things \u201ctenuous, remote, or peripheral.\u201d<\/p>\n

In her first question of the argument, Justice Amy Coney Barrett asked whether the court should decide the case under the safety exception. Clement urged the justices to do so. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson raised the prospect that Congress simply wanted to preserve the status quo on safety, leaving states free to decide who gets sued. Clement agreed and added that the states get to make judgments about whether liability goes to the broker or carrier.<\/p>\n

As is his style, Kavanaugh focused on practicality and \u201ccommon sense,\u201d asking how brokers are supposed to check drivers\u2019 English proficiency (\u201ca critical issue at the current moment\u201d) or drug use without forcing them to hire only large, established carriers. Clement replied that brokers, both large and small, can insist on proper testing programs and that the threat of liability stops them from picking the cheapest, unchecked options. (Later in the argument, Clement added that, as noted in Montgomery\u2019s reply brief, 45% of carriers don\u2019t actually own their vehicles and 94% have never had a safety exam by the federal government.)<\/p>\n

Representing the companies, Theodore Boutrous argued that brokers are middlemen who arrange transportation but never touch or control a motor vehicle. Claims targeting their \u201ccore service\u201d of matchmaking are therefore preempted under (c)(1) and not saved by the narrow (c)(2) exception, Boutrous contended. Boutrous disagreed with Justice Sonia Sotomayor that brokers are \u201cputting the driver in the seat\u201d \u2013 rather, carriers are. Boutrous also told the court that allowing negligent-hiring suits against brokers would create a patchwork that \u201cbollix[es] up the broker duty\u201d and interstate commerce.<\/p>\n

In response, Justice Clarence Thomas asked Boutrous whether brokers would win on proximate-cause grounds regardless. Boutrous replied that they often do, but only after expensive discovery.<\/p>\n

Sotomayor then asked why, if a state can deem a driver unfit (or mandate an age requirement or seatbelts), can it not hold the broker liable for putting that driver behind the wheel of a truck. Boutrous\u2019 answer was that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration already licenses freight carriers, so states cannot second-guess that federal judgment.<\/p>\n

Sopan Joshi, an assistant to the U.S. solicitor general who argued as a \u201cfriend of the court\u201d in support of the companies, stressed the textual contrast between the broad phrase \u201ctransportation of property\u201d in the preemption clause and the narrower \u201cmotor vehicles\u201d in the exception. The federal scheme, he said, treats carriers, not brokers, as the \u201clowest-cost-avoider\u201d responsible for safety. Allowing broker liability, Joshi said, would shrink the pool of available carriers to only the largest ones (\u201cbrokers are going to follow the \u2026 no one ever got fired for buying IBM principle\u201d), which counters the deregulation that Congress intended in passing the FAAAA.<\/p>\n

Perhaps Joshi\u2019s most memorable line, though, was in his opening statement. \u201cSuppose there were a rule that applied with respect to coffee, cream, and sugar and then an exception that applied only with respect to coffee,\u201d Joshi said. \u201cYou would naturally think that the exception does not apply with respect to cream and sugar, even though that phrase in isolation might cause you to adopt the opposite view. I think that\u2019s kind of what\u2019s going on here, and that\u2019s why I think [the companies\u2019] reading of the statute is the better one.\u201d<\/p>\n

In his rebuttal, Clement returned to Joshi\u2019s coffee analogy: if you sue McDonald\u2019s<\/a> because its coffee spilled and burned you, that claim is \u201cwith respect to coffee,\u201d not some unrelated service. Here, Clement says, the tort is squarely \u201cwith respect to\u201d the \u201c80,000-pound motor vehicle\u201d that caused the injury. He urged the court to reverse on the safety-exception ground and leave it at that.<\/p>\n

A decision in the case is expected by June.<\/p>\n

\n

Cases: Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC<\/a><\/p>\n

Recommended Citation:<\/strong> Nora Collins, Court grapples with whether federal law supersedes negligent hiring claims against freight brokers<\/em>, SCOTUSblog<\/span> (Mar. 5, 2026, 4:27 PM), https:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/2026\/03\/court-grapples-with-whether-federal-law-supersedes-negligent-hiring-claims-against-freight-brokers\/ <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/a><\/strong> <\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

… preempts state law claims that a freight<\/span> broker negligently hired a motor carrier … Carrier Safety Administration already licenses freight<\/span> carriers, so states cannot second … supersedes negligent hiring claims against freight<\/span> brokers, SCOTUSblog (Mar. 5, 2026 …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"fifu_image_url":"","fifu_image_alt":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-112314","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news","wpcat-1-id"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new7.shop\/zerocostfreehost\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/112314","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new7.shop\/zerocostfreehost\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new7.shop\/zerocostfreehost\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new7.shop\/zerocostfreehost\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new7.shop\/zerocostfreehost\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=112314"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new7.shop\/zerocostfreehost\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/112314\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new7.shop\/zerocostfreehost\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=112314"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new7.shop\/zerocostfreehost\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=112314"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new7.shop\/zerocostfreehost\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=112314"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}